Market Size, Product Differentiation and Bidding for New Varieties by Wooton, Ian & Ma, Jie
Wooton, Ian and Ma, Jie (2017) Market Size, Product Differentiation and 
Bidding for New Varieties. Discussion paper. Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, London. , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/60766/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Market Size, Product Dierentiation
and Bidding for New Varieties1
Jie Ma2
University of International Business and Economics
Ian Wooton3
University of Strathclyde, CEPR and CESifo
26 March 2017
1An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Trade Study Group
conference in Helsinki and a seminar at the University of Strathclyde. We would like to
thank Giuseppe De Feo, Ben Ferrett and Pascalis Raimondos for helpful comments. Jie Ma
thanks Wei Du for her excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
2Department of International Trade, School of International Trade and Economics, Uni-
versity of International Business and Economics, No. 10 Huixin Dongjie, Chaoyang District,
Beijing 100029, China; e-mail: jie.ma@uibe.edu.cn.
3Department of Economics, Strathclyde Business School, 199 Cathedral Street, Glasgow
G4 0QU, United Kingdom; e-mail: ian.wooton@strath.ac.uk.
Abstract
We analyse a Þrms investment decision in a regional economy composed of two coun-
tries. The Þrm already manufactures a horizontally dierentiated good in the region
and we determine the Þrms equilibrium location choice for the new good and the
welfare consequences of Þscal competition between the two countries. The outcome
is the result of interactions among market-size, product-dierentiation, and import-
substitution eects. The Þrst two eects represent the fundamental trade-o facing the
Þrm. The third eect provides each country with an economic incentive to compete for
the FDI. Past papers have addressed the market-size and import-substitution eects
but, as far as we know, the product-dierentiation eect is new to the literature.
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1 Introduction
International policy competition to attract foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI)
has become commonplace in the past thirty years and seems to be on the rise.1 Firms
care about the location of their production facilities, wanting to minimize their produc-
tion costs while being close to their major consumer markets. For their part, national
governments prefer local manufacturing over imports, as this provides domestic jobs
and demand for local services as well as cheaper consumer products. Given this pref-
erence for local production, a government may oer incentives in order to persuade
Þrms to locate their production facilities within its territory. When there is more than
one candidate country as host of the FDI, international Þscal competition may arise
to attract the manufacturing facilities. Two recent examples of such competition for
FDI are: Intels $1 billion assembly and testing plant in Ho Chi Minh City, opened
in 2010 after Vietnam had beaten India and China in attracting the factory;2 and
Daimlers 2016 announcement that Poland had overcome competition from Slovakia,
Romania and Hungary in the competition to attract the companys 0.5 billion Euro
engine factory.3
In recent years, a number of papers have been written examining dierent aspects of
international competition to inßuence the location of production. We contribute to
this growing literature by arguing that product dierentiation, a factor that has been
largely overlooked, may aect the FDI location choice, investment policy and national
welfare in interesting ways. This paper considers the choice of a monopolistic Þrm as
to whether it should invest in the introduction of a second, horizontally dierentiated
variety of a good that it currently produces and sells in a 2-country regional economy.
We assume that one country is larger than the other and consequently, in line with
the established literature, the production of the original variety takes place in this
larger nation. The Þrms decision, then, is not just whether or not to introduce the
new variety, but where to produce this variety. We examine the factors inßuencing
the Þrms choice and, in particular, how Þscal competition between the two nations to
attract this second new FDI aects the outcome in equilibrium.
1Overviews of competition for FDI can be found in, e.g., UNCTAD (1996), Oman (2000), Charlton
(2003) and Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004).
2See http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2010/10/intel_opens_plants_in_vietnam.html.
3See https://www.ft.com/content/6e3d4afc-11dc-11e6-bb40-c30e3bfcf63b.
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In this setting, we Þnd that the Þrms decision as to the location of the new FDI is inßu-
enced by the interactions of three eects: a market-size eect, a product-dierentiation
eect, and an import-substitution eect. The Þrst two of these eects represent the fun-
damental trade-o for an MNE in making its location choice. The last eect provides
each country with an economic incentive to compete for FDI. The existing literature
has addressed the market-size and import-substitution eects but, as far as we know,
the product-dierentiation eect that we identify in this paper is new to the literature
of Þscal competition with imperfectly competitive markets. We show that allocative
e!ciency is always achieved regardless of whether or not the countries engage in com-
petition to attract the MNE. Thus the international competition only aects the distri-
bution of gains between the Þrm (after-tax proÞts) and the host country (tax revenues),
and not the location of production in equilibrium. We further show the circumstances
under which the international competition for FDI can be weakly Pareto-improving for
the competing countries.
Our analysis has interesting implications for international investment policy. There has
been a hot policy debate about the possible eects on the competing countries of their
engaging in a bidding war for FDI. The opponents of FDI competition argue that
the competition results in a pure waste of the competing countries resources and may
weaken their public Þnances and distort the location of investment. The advocates of
FDI competition argue against tax harmonization since it is, eectively, a governmental
tax and spending cartel that would be considered objectionable if it took arose between
private concerns. Our analysis suggests that although the MNEs location choice is
always e!cient, FDI competition can erode the welfare of competing countries when
neither country has an overwhelming edge over its rival in the FDI competition and
the winner has to pay a subsidy in equilibrium to the MNE in order to attract the
FDI. This might lead to a call for international cooperation in investment policy.4
However, when the winning country has an advantage in FDI competition that cannot
be matched by its rival, there is no need for tax harmonization as the Þrm pays a tax
to the host country in equilibrium.
4Also see UNCTAD (2012) and UNCTAD (2015).
2
1.1 Related literature
We investigate investment decisions in a two-country regional setting, where a Þrm from
the rest of the world produces goods for consumers in both countries.5 International
trade is costly, such that the Þrm faces a higher cost in supplying consumers through
exports as compared to domestic production. The price faced in a market reßects this
cost dierence, so consumers prefer local production to imports. We therefore assume
that, ceteris paribus, nations prefer local production to imports, creating the incentive
for national governments to compete to attract the FDI.6 The governments of the two
potential host nations set their taxes/subsidies independently and non-cooperatively
in order to maximize their national social welfare.
This basic framework has been used in a number of papers. Haußer and Wooton (1999)
introduce this model to determine which country will succeed in attracting FDI when
the two countries are dierent sizes. They Þnd that the larger country always wins and,
if there is a su!ciently large dierential in the sizes of the two countries, the larger
country may attract the FDI in equilibrium with a positive tax, despite the smaller,
unsuccessful country being willing to subsidize the Þrms investment.
Barros and Cabral (2000) examine the case where two competing countries again dier
in size, but the smaller country suers from problems of unemployment, while the larger
country does not. Since the smaller countrys valuation of FDI may be higher than that
of the larger country, it may win the FDI in equilibrium. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)
also have this asymmetry in country size but, in addition, consider the implications of
there being a domestic Þrm already producing in the larger country. The presence of
this incumbent Þrm makes the domestic market of the larger country more competitive
for the investing Þrm and may lead the latter to choose to locate its FDI in the smaller
5The assumption that no-one in the region owns the Þrm simpliÞes the analysis in that competing
countries can ingnore the implications of taxes or subsidies on the proÞts of the Þrm. Ferrett and
Wooton (2010a) Þnd that this assumption does not aect the outcome of the competition for a single
production facility and we anticipate that their result would hold in this case where countries are
bidding for a second plant.
6There may be several other reasons to attract local production (such as reducing involuntary
unemployment, attracting jobs with premium wages, or generating production externalities for local
industry, etc.) while there may be also be disadvantages to the FDI (such as environmental degra-
dation). For the sake of simplicity and analytical tractability, we focus on the increase in consumer
surplus associated with domestic production.
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country. In this setting, international policy competition can result in a more e!cient
location choice by the Þrm. With a similar structure, except that the incumbent is a
public, welfare-maximizing (as opposed to a private) Þrm, Amerighi and De Feo (2017)
Þnd that this e!ciency-enhancing feature of policy competition does not hold. Thus the
eects of policy competition depend crucially on the nature of the domestic incumbent.
Ferrett andWooton (2010b) build on the Haußer andWooton framework by asking how
the equilibrium outcome is changed when the countries are competing for FDI from two
Þrms producing a homogeneous good, as opposed to a single Þrm. If both Þrms invest in
the same country, they experience more competition than if the Þrms were to spatially
separate their FDI. In this latter case, the Þrm investing in the smaller country is at a
disadvantage. If the size dierence between the two countries is su!ciently great, the
Þrms will accept the more competitive market environment arising from both investing
in the larger country. In our paper, we treat the entry of the Þrst plant as exogenous
and consider only the location choice of the new investment while we also move away
from the assumption that the two goods are perfect substitutes.
Ma (2013) also analyses policy competition for the FDI of a foreign-owned monopolist
by two asymmetric countries, where one country has a larger economy than the other.
He assumes that the smaller country produces an intermediate input into Þnal good
production, while the larger country does not. He shows that whether or not a coun-
try wins the FDI competition is determined by the interactions between the relative
transport cost of the intermediate and Þnal goods, and the market size of the larger
country relative to that of the smaller country. The policy competition for FDI in this
situation may Pareto-weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries. Ma
and Raimondos (2016) point out that, when two countries compete for the FDI, they
should be aware of the proÞt-shifting opportunities enjoyed by the MNE. By mod-
eling explicitly the parent MNE and its intra-Þrm transactions, they show that the
market-size advantage of the larger country will be counteracted by the proÞt-shifting
opportunities oered by its smaller rival in equilibrium. As a result of this, the larger
country will not be able to capitalize on its size and sustain as high corporate taxes as
previously concluded. In some cases, the MNE may actually end up choosing to locate
in the smaller country.7
Our contribution to this literature is in investigating the interactions between market
7Ma (2017) studies the impact of special interest lobbying on FDI competition.
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size and product dierentiation. Once again, there will be two countries of dierent size,
competing to attract additional investment when one good is already being produced
within the region. The novelty of our model is that the second good is an imperfect
substitute for the existing good and both will be produced by the same Þrm. This
means that the single Þrm will internalize the potential competition between the two
goods, choosing where (and if) to make its investment so as to maximize its after-tax
regional proÞts.8
Ra (2004) extends the two-country framework of policy competition to examine the
eects of free-trade agreements and customs unions on MNEs FDI location choices
and welfare, taking into account that governments may adjust both taxes and external
taris to compete for FDI. Haußer and Wooton (2006) also extend the two-country
framework to study the eects of a regionally coordinated proÞt tax or location subsidy
on FDI competition.
Our paper is also related to the literature of tax competition for mobile capital in
traditional public Þnance. See Keen and Konrad (2013) for a recent survey. In a per-
fectly competitive environment, they introduces asymmetries between countries and
study the interaction of dierent tax instruments. However, it is well known that this
approach is more appropriate when dealing with competition for portfolio investments
rather than for FDI.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model while
Sections 3 and 4 examine the Þrms location choice without and with Þscal competition
for FDI, respectively. In section 5, we discuss the welfare implications of the Þscal
competition. The Þnal section concludes.9
8Haaparanta (1996) uses a common agency approach to studying competition for FDI between two
countries with unequal wage rate. Both countries face problems of unemployment and will gain from
FDI from increased employment (reduced unemployment). He treats FDI as being perfectly divisible
and considers the impact of policy competition on how the foreign Þrm allocates its capital between
the competing countries. This dierentiates his paper from our paper and other previous contributions
cited.
9Some technical discussions can be found in the Appendix.
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2 The model
We consider a partial equilibrium model of production and consumption in a regional
setting. There are two countries in the region, indexed by l 5 {D>E}. The market size of
D is normalized to 1 while Q is the market size of country E, where Q  1.10 An MNE
owned by agents outside of the region can produce two varieties of the consumption
good, indexed by m> n 5 {1> 2}. Let slm denote the market price of variety m in country
l, while tlm is the corresponding per-capita quantity demanded of variety m in country
l. Given our assumptions about the sizes of the two countries, the total demand for
variety m in country D is TDm = tDm while the total demand for that variety in country
E is TEm = QtEm .
Initially only a single variety, good 1, is available as the result of past FDI in the region
by the MNE. In this situation, the inverse demand of a representative consumer in
country l for this variety is given by sl
1
= 1  tl
1
. The marginal cost of production
is assumed to be the same in both countries and, for simplicity, set at zero. However,
exports of the good incur a transport cost of  A 0 per unit. On that basis, we anticipate
that the MNE will have established its production plant for the Þrst variety in the larger
country in order to serve the regional market.11 We further assume that sunk costs of
investment are su!ciently large that the Þrm will not choose to move the production
of this variety at any point.
The MNE faces the decision as to whether or not it should introduce to the region
a new variety of the product, good 2, that is horizontally dierentiated from good 1,
the existing variety. Its decision to make the investment will depend upon a number
of factors, including production and trade costs, the strength of demand for the good,
consumers love of variety, and the degree to which the two varieties are dierent from
one another. If the new variety is made available in the regional market, we assume
that the inverse demand for variety m by a representative consumer in country l is:12
slm = 1 tlm  etln> (1)
where m 6= n. The parameter e 5 [0> 1] measures the degree of product dierentiation.
10Q measures the market size of country E relative to that of country D.
11This supposition is in line with existing models, e.g. Haußer and Wooton (1999).
12See the Appendix for our discussion of the quasi-linear utility function from which the inverse-
demand systems are derived. In the main text, this is implicitly assumed.
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Clearly, as e approaches unity, the two varieties become even closer substitutes for each
other. In contrast, when e falls, the two varieties become increasingly dierentiated such
that they become distinct goods at e = 1.
The cost of importing goods from outside of the region is assumed to be prohibitive.
Hence, if the MNE wishes to introduce a new variety into the region, it must make an
investment in one of the two countries.13 When the MNE decides to invest in country
D, it has to pay a Þxed cost to establish a new plant to produce the new variety. If the
Þrm wishes to co-locate production and manufacture both varieties in country E, it
can do so by paying a Þxed cost to upgrade its existing plant. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that these Þxed costs are the same and equal to i A 0.14 Exporting variety
2 incurs the same cost of  per unit. We assume that the trade cost is su!ciently small
that:
 ? (1 e) =
This assumption guarantees that the MNE should be able to service both countries
demands for the two varieties irrespective of its location choice for the new investment.
The Þxed cost of FDI and the trade cost are the only costs that the MNE faces in order
to set up and supply both varieties in the regional market. There are two asymmetries
already in the model that will aect the choice of location of the new variety: the
countries dier in size; while the MNEs production of the Þrst variety is already located
in the larger country.
The incentives facing the agents in the model are as follows. The MNE receives its
proÞts net of any tax or subsidy that the host country of its new investment puts in
place. Each countrys national welfare is the sum of the consumer surplus of its citizens
together with tax revenues. Consumer surplus will rise when production takes place
within the country but this may be accompanied by a fall in tax revenues if a subsidy
has to be paid to attract the FDI. As the MNE is assumed to be owned by agents
outside of the region, proÞts of the MNE are not part of either nations welfare.
If the countries engage in tax competition to attract the FDI, then they and the MNE
13We make this assumption since the trade versus FDI choice is well understood from the literature
on trade costs and foreign direct investment. See, e.g. Neary (2009) for a survey. It is not the focus of
our paper.
14This assumption is in line with previous contributions. Allowing for dierences in Þxed investment
costs would have obvious eects on the FDI location choice. All else equal, the lower cost country
becomes a relatively more attractive location.
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play a two-stage game of complete information in order to determine the location of
the production of the new variety, good 2. In the Þrst stage of the game, each country
simultaneously and non-cooperatively announces its oer of a lump-sum subsidy vl to
the MNE, conditional on it being chosen as host of the FDI.15 In the second stage,
after observing the oers, the MNE makes its location choice for its new investment,
then services the regional demand from that country.
We introduce the following notation to represent the locations of the production of
the two varieties. We have assumed that the existing variety, good 1, is produced in
country E, so the outcomes dier as to where the second variety, good 2, is produced.
We denote the situation when the MNE decides against supplying the new variety in
the regional market as (E>B). (E>E) is the case where the MNE co-located production
in the larger country E, while (E>D) is when the MNE makes the new investment in
the smaller country D. The corresponding equilibrium values for the three cases are
indicated by subscripts B, E, and D for (E>B), (E>E) and (E>D), respectively. As
usual, we solve the model by backward induction.
3 Location choice without Þscal competition
In this section, we analyse the MNEs location choice when countries do not engage in
subsidy competition for FDI. The countries refrain from making oers to attract the
new FDI while maintaining their existing, exogenous policies, which we assume to be
the same across the two countries. This will allow us to establish the degree to which
country E presents a more or less attractive destination for the new FDI, as compared
to country D. We can then examine the MNEs proÞt-maximizing location choice given
the relative geographic advantages of the two countries.
Firstly, we determine whether or not the MNE has an incentive to introduce the new
variety into the region. When the MNE decides upon (E>B), where it focuses on its
existing variety and foregoes the regional production and sale of the new variety, good 2,
our model replicates Haußer and Wooton (1999). In this case, it is easy to show that:
tD
1
=
1 
2
> tE
1
=
1
2
;
sD
1
=
1 + 
2
> sE
1
=
1
2
;
15The subsidy becomes a lump-sum tax if vl is strictly negative.
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fvDB =
1
8
(1 )2 > fvEB =
Q
8
; (2)
WB =
1
4
£
Q + (1 )2
¤
;
where fvlB denotes country ls consumer surplus and WB represents the MNEs proÞts
in the equilibrium in which a single variety is produced.
If the Þxed investment cost i is relatively small, then the MNE will introduce the new
variety to the region because its operating proÞts net of the investment cost will be
larger than WB. When the MNE chooses to produce the new variety in country E,
exporting both varieties to country D, it receives operating proÞts of:
E = Q
£¡
1 tE
1
 etE
2
¢
tE
1
+
¡
1 etE
1
 tE
2
¢
tE
2
¤
+
¡
1 tD
1
 etD
2
 
¢
tD
1
+
¡
1 etD
1
 tD
2
 
¢
tD
2
=
It is straightforward to calculate the MNEs equilibrium sales and prices of each variety
in the two markets. We have:16
tD
1
= tD
2
=
1 
2 (1 + e) > t
E
1
= tE
2
=
1
2 (1 + e);
sD
1
= sD
2
=
1 + 
2
> sE
1
= sE
2
=
1
2
=
Consequently, when the MNE chooses to locate the production of the new variety in
country E, its equilibrium operating proÞts are:
WE =
1
2 (1 + e)
£
Q + (1 )2
¤
= (3)
We note that:
WE
WB
=
2
(1 + e) A 1= (4)
The MNE has higher operating proÞts when it produces both varieties in country E
than when it produces a single variety. Therefore, if the Þxed investment cost, i , of
introducing the second variety is relatively small, then the MNE will have an incentive
to manufacture both horizontally dierentiated goods in the region. We henceforth
16Note that our results on prices and quantities are in line with the results obtained in Amir,
Jin, Pech, and Tröge (2016). Given our demand structure, for monopoly Þrms supplying at least two
goods with constant marginal cost, the price for each good is independent of demand cross-eects (the
parameter e in our model) and the number and characteristics of other goods. However, equilibrium
outputs do depend on these relationships.
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assume that i is su!ciently small to guarantee that the Þrm wishes to introduce the
new variety, good 2 in the regional market, a su!cient condition for which is that
i ?
¡
WE  WB
¢
.17
Alternatively, theMNE could choose to produce the new variety in countryD, exporting
it to country E. In that case, it would receive operating proÞts of:
D = Q
£¡
1 tE
1
 etE
2
¢
tE
1
+
¡
1 etE
1
 tE
2
 
¢
tE
2
¤
+
¡
1 tD
1
 etD
2
 
¢
tD
1
+
¡
1 etD
1
 tD
2
¢
tD
2
=
It is easy to calculate the MNEs equilibrium sales and prices of each variety in the two
markets as:18
tD
1
=
(1 ) e
2 (1 e2) > t
E
1
=
1 e (1 )
2 (1 e2) >
tD
2
=
1 e (1 )
2 (1 e2) > t
E
2
=
(1 ) e
2 (1 e2) ;
sD
1
=
1 + 
2
> sE
1
=
1
2
>
sD
2
=
1
2
> sE
2
=
1 + 
2
=
Our assumption that  ? (1 e), ensures that both tD
1
A 0 and tE
2
A 0. From these
expressions, we can determine that the equilibrium operating proÞts of the MNE, when
it chooses to locate the production of the new variety in country D, will be:
WD =
(Q + 1)
4 (1 e2)
£
1 + (1 )2  2e (1 )
¤
= (5)
We are now able to determine the MNEs location choice for its new investment when
the two countries do not engage in subsidy competition for the new FDI. Expressions
(3) and (5), provide a measure of country Es geographic advantage, the dierence
in the MNEs proÞt from locating its new investment in country E rather than in
country D, where:
{  WE  WD =

4 (1 e2) [(Q  1) (2 ) 2e (Q  1 + )] = (6)
17Obviously, it will be less interesting when the Þxed investment costs are so high that the MNEs
net proÞts from manufacturing the new variety are less than its proÞts when it only sells the
existing variety. In fact, the results there can be inferred from Haußer and Wooton (1999).
It may be argued that, compared with the case where the two countries do not engage in FDI
competition, the competition may provide the MNE with a su!cient incentive to make the new
investment. This may be true. But it should be noted that the Þxed investment cost and the scale
eect associated with it are not the focus of this paper.
18Again, the results are in line with those obtained in Amir, Jin, Pech, and Tröge (2016).
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At one extreme, when the two countries are the same size (Q = 1) and given the
existence of intra-regional trade costs, { and the consequent FDI location choice is
entirely driven by the degree of product dierentiation between the two varieties. In
short, as consumers in country E have access to domestic production of the Þrst variety,
proÞt maximization will require the Þrm to locate the new investment in country D in
order to reduce its trade costs of supplying an identically sized market. When e is close
to unity and  is relatively large, then the similarity in the varieties may be su!cient
that each national market is served exclusively by its domestic production facility and
no trade takes place. This outcome represents trade-cost jumping, horizontal FDI.
Lower values of e would result in consumers in each market wanting to consume both
varieties, resulting in trade but the second variety would continue to be produced in
country D. Only when the varieties are completely distinct from each other (e = 0),
would the proÞt dierence disappear such that the Þrm would not care about the
location of the second variety.
As Q increases, giving country E a larger population than that of country D, then
all else equal country E becomes the relatively more attractive host for the new FDI,
except in the limiting case of e = 1, where the production of a second, identical variety is
only justiÞable in country D. As the products become more dierentiated, the stronger
the Þrms incentive to locate the production of both varieties in the larger market,
such that when e = 0, the varieties are distinct from one another and { is guaranteed
to be positive. This latter result replicates Haußer and Wooton (1999) for a separate,
additional product in that the market-size advantage drives the MNE to choose the
larger country E for its FDI.19
In summary, the MNEs location choice for its new investment is driven by the in-
teraction between what we deÞne as a product-dierentiation eect and a market-size
eect. Products are more distinctive, and hence the product-dierentiation eect is
stronger, the smaller is the value of e. As Q increases, the dierence in the sizes of
the two countries becomes more pronounced, strengthening the market-size eect. The
stronger these eects are, the more attractive the larger marketplace becomes, giving
it a greater geographic advantage. Thus the interplay between e and Q , for any given
level of  , determines which country is the more attractive location for the production
19It is easy to see that, when  = 0,  = 0 and the location choice is irrelevant. This is not
surprising and is in line with existing literature.
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Figure 1: Location of the second variety in absence of policy competition
of the second variety of the product. It is useful to deÞne a critical level of product
dierentiation, eW, a function of Q (and ) such that the two eects exactly oset one
another, where:
eW  (Q  1) (2 )
2 [Q  (1 )] = (7)
We can then summarize our discussion in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 When countries do not engage in FDI competition, the MNE will locate
its new investment in the smaller country D if and only if e A eW; otherwise it will
produce the new variety in the larger country E.20
Proof See expression (6). Setting { = 0 immediately implies the Proposition. ¥
20We therefore omit the knife-edge cases.
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We discuss this result with the help of Figure 1. The horizontal axis measures Q ,
the market size of country E relative to that of country D, while the vertical axis
measures the degree of product dierentiation, e. The curve represents the eW threshold
determined by expression (7). When parameter conÞgurations lie to the left of the curve,
the smaller country D wins the MNEs new investment; otherwise, the larger country
E wins the FDI competition for the new variety. It is easy to see that the vertical axis
is in the winning region of country D. As Q $ 1, country Es market-size advantage
diminishes and the product-dierentiation eect drives the MNE to produce the new
variety in country D. It is also straightforward to see that the horizontal axis is in the
winning region of country E. As e $ 0, the MNEs existing and new varieties become
distinct goods. Hence, the market-size eect drives the MNE to locate the production
of its new variety in country E.
Our result diers from that of Bjorvatn and Eckel, where the FDI location choice
is determined by the interaction between the market-size eect and the competition
generated by two Þrms producing in the market. In contrast, we have no inter-Þrm
competition as the second variety is produced by the same Þrm. In our model, when
theMNEmakes the new investment in countryE, it enjoys the market-size advantage of
the larger country. The Þrm may be cannibalizing its own market but, as it produces
both varieties, it maximizes industry proÞts, whereas the new (foreign) product in
Bjorvatn and Eckel directly competes with that of the incumbent local Þrm.
4 Subsidy competition for FDI
We now examine the two countries incentives to subsidize the MNEs FDI. Consumer
welfare was irrelevant to the location choice of the MNE in the previous section, as
the Þrm made its decision purely on the basis of its proÞtability. But the FDI location
choice has an impact on consumers. The national levels of consumer surplus when a
second variety is introduced are:
fvDD =
 2 + 2 (1 ) (1 e)
8 (1 e2) > fv
E
D =
Q [ 2 + 2 (1 ) (1 e)]
8 (1 e2) ;
fvDE =
(1 )2
4 (1 + e) > fv
E
E =
Q
4 (1 + e);
(8)
where fvln is the consumer surplus in country l when the second variety is produced
in country n. When we compare the terms in expression (8) with consumer surpluses
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in countries with a single variety, expression (2), it is clear that consumers in both
nations beneÞt from the introduction of the second variety. Beyond that, citizens of
both countries will generally gain more from having the FDI for the second variety
taking place in their own country than in the other nation. We see this by comparing
the beneÞts of being host to the production of the second variety to importing it,
deÞning the net beneÞts to the countries from attracting the FDI as:
{ZD  fvDD  fvDE =

8 (1 e2) [2   2e (1 )] > (9)
{ZE  fvEE  fvED =
Q
8 (1 e2) [2   2e] = (10)
Our maintained assumption that  ? (1 e) is a su!cient condition that {Z l A 0 for
both countries, l 5 {D>E}. Each country beneÞts from hosting the production of the
new variety, as the prices of locally produced goods are lower than those of the imports,
resulting in greater consumption surplus under FDI. Consequently, countries will be
prepared to compete with each other by oering subsidies as inducements to attract the
FDI to their shores. We deÞne this impetus to attract FDI to be the import-substitution
eect.
In the Þrst stage of the game of competition for the new FDI, countries D and E will
oer lump-sum subsidies (negative taxes) vD and vE, respectively. In the second stage
of the game, after it has observed these oers, the MNE will choose its investment
location in order to maximize its after-tax proÞts. Therefore, it will establish a new
production plant in country D if and only if WD + vD A WE + vE. Otherwise, it will
choose to produce the new variety in country E. Clearly, in addition to the trade-
o between the market-size and the production-dierentiation eects discussed in the
previous section, the MNEs location choice is now aected by the subsidies on oer
from the two countries, which are directly linked to the import-substitution eect.
The Þrst stage of the Nash subsidy game is a slight variant of a Þrst-price, sealed-bid
auction of complete information, in which the player with the highest willingness-to-pay
for the object wins it with a payment equal to the second-highest bidders willingness-
to-pay. In FDI competition, a countrys net beneÞt from the new investment is simply
its valuation of the FDI. The complication in tax competition models of this type is
that the country with the highest valuation of the FDI may not win the MNEs new
investment. The MNEmay have dierent pre-tax proÞts arising from its location choice
(the pre-tax geographic advantage enjoyed by one of the countries) and this has to be
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taken into account together with the dierence in the countries valuation of FDI. With
this in mind, we can characterize the equilibrium of the Þrst stage game. The smaller
country D will win the FDI competition if and only if:
{ZD A {ZE +{; (11)
where its winning bid is a subsidy to the Þrm equal to:
vDW = {ZE +{= (12)
Otherwise, the larger country E will attract the MNE and pay it a subsidy equal to:
vEW = {ZD {= (13)
This leads us to the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 When the two countries compete for the MNEs new investment, the
Þrm will choose to locate the production of the new variety in the smaller country D if
and only if e A eW; otherwise it will make the new investment in the larger country E.
Proof Condition (11) implies the Proposition immediately. ¥
A direct implication of this Proposition is that the international competition to attract
the FDI has no impact on the MNEs location choice. Thus allocative e!ciency is
unaected by the equilibrium oers made by the countries. There is a distributional
impact however, in that the oers made as a result of the competition to attract the
FDI will involve transfers between citizens of the winning country and the MNE.21
Given this, we now determine the direction of the equilibrium transfer. That is, we
shall work out whether the winning country subsidizes the MNE or attracts the FDI
despite charging a tax.22
21Since we have linear demands for dierentiated products and constant marginal costs, it turns out
that the dierence between country Es valuation of the FDI and that of country D, ZE ZD,
is proportionate to the dierence in the MNEs proÞt from locating its new investment in country E
rather than in country D, . As the former is one half of the latter, we have our result.
In our model, subsidy competition does not change FDI location choice, a result shared with Haußer
and Wooton (1999) and Ma (2013). In contrast, Barros and Cabral (2000), Fumagalli (2003), Bjorvatn
and Eckel (2006) and Ma (2017) all show the situations where the FDI competition may
change the MNEs location choice.
22The MNE always has an option not to introduce the new variety into the region, in which case
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4.1 The smaller country attracts the FDI
First, we consider the case when the smaller country D wins the FDI competition. In
order to do so, we deÞne a new threshold level of product dierentiation:
eWW = (3Q  2) (2 )
2 [3Q  2 (1 )] = (14)
As eW ? eWW, this new threshold corresponds to a level of product dierentiation such
that the two varieties are su!ciently similar that the FDI will take place in country D.
The remaining question is whether the FDI is attracted in equilibrium with a subsidy
or a tax. This is clariÞed in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 When country D attracts the MNEs new investment, it collects a tax
from the MNE if and only if e A eWW, otherwise, it subsidizes the FDI in equilibrium.
Proof Rewriting expression (12), we Þnd:
vDW =  [3Q  2 (1 )]
4 (1 e2) (e
WW  e) = (15)
Given that e A eW A 0, then vDW A 0 if and only if e ? eWW. ¥
The larger country Es valuation of the FDI is strictly positive, while the dierence in
pre-tax proÞts makes the MNE prefer to invest in the smaller country D. When e = eWW,
these elements exactly oset one another such that country D can attract the FDI
with zero subsidy when country E makes its best oer. When e A eWW, the varieties are
su!ciently alike that country E, the host of the existing varietys production facilities,
is less enthusiastic about attracting production of the new variety, while investing in
country D becomes more proÞtable. As a result, country D can win the competition
with a tax.
4.2 The larger country attracts the FDI
Things are more complicated when country E wins the new FDI. This happens when
e ? eW, which arises when the larger market size of country E and the degree of product
it earns B . Therefore, when countries have an opportunity to tax the MNE, the tax vl ? 0 should
also satisfy the MNEs participation constraint. When the Þrm locates in country l, this corresponds
to
¡
vl + l
¢
 B  i . Our results do not change qualitatively.
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dierentiation are such that the Þrm decides that it is more proÞtable to locate both
varieties in the same country (see Proposition 1). We show now that country E can
attract the new investment with a tax, if the dierence in market size is su!ciently
great and the two varieties are su!ciently distinct from one another. First we deÞne a
new threshold value for the degree of product dierentiation eWWW as:
eWWW  (2Q  3) (2 )
2 [2Q  3 (1 )] = (16)
Given that our measure of product dierentiation is deÞned over the unit interval,
eWWW is restricted such that eWWW 5 [0> 1] only when Q  3@2. Taking into account this
restriction, it can easily be shown that eWWW ? eW. We can also use expression (16) to
rewrite expression (13) for Es winning bid as:
vEW =  [2Q  3 (1 )]
4 (1 e2) (e e
WWW) = (17)
We state our result in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider the case where country E wins the FDI competition.
(i) When Q A 3@2, country E taxes the MNE if and only if e ? eWWW; otherwise, it
subsidizes the MNE.
(ii) When Q  3@2, whenever country E attracts the new investment, it must pay a
subsidy to the MNE in equilibrium.
Proof
(i) When Q A 3@2, we see from expression (17) that:
vEW ? 0 if and only if e ? eWWW ? eW;
vEW A 0 if and only if eWWW ? e ? eW=
(ii) When Q = 3@2, eWWW = 0, and so vEW A 0. If the size of country E fell below
Q = 3@2, its geographic advantage from having a larger domestic market would be
eroded. The Þrms proÞts from locating in country E decline as the country shrinks in
size. In order to match the best oer from country D, country E will have to increase
its subsidy in order to persuade the Þrm to locate within its borders. Thus country E
will continue to attract the FDI whenever e ? eW but the subsidy that it has to oer
in equilibrium will rise as Q falls. ¥
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Country Ds valuation of the FDI is strictly positive, while the MNE has an incentive
to locate production of the new variety in country E whenever the latter country oers
a su!ciently large market and the two varieties are relatively distinct. When country E
is not that much bigger than country D and the varieties become quite similar, then
country E will have to pay the MNE a subsidy in equilibrium in order to get the new
investment.
We now turn to an analysis of the welfare consequences of FDI competition.
5 Welfare implications of Þscal competition
First, we study whether Þscal competition to attract the FDI achieves allocative e!-
ciency. We then turn to examine whether a competing country gains or loses from the
FDI competition, compared with the situation where the countries do not engage in
it. As noted in the previous section, the competition for FDI does not aect the FDI
location choice. Indeed, it is e!cient, as stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 5 The MNEs location choice for its new investment is e!cient, in that
it maximizes total world welfare, regardless of whether or not there is international
competition for the FDI.
Proof When e A eW, the MNE chooses to produce the new variety in the smaller coun-
try D irrespective of whether or not the two countries engage in the FDI competition.
With appropriate substitutions, condition (11) can be rewritten as
£
fvDD + fvED + WD
¤
£
fvDE + fvEE + WE
¤
A 0. Similar arguments apply for the case when e ? eW, and the MNE
makes the new investment in the larger country E. ¥
That FDI competition achieves allocative e!ciency is well known in the existing lit-
erature.23 We have shown that this also holds in our model, in that the subsidies or
taxes in equilibrium have no impact on the Þrms choice of location for the FDI.
Fiscal competition for FDI will, however, aect the international distribution of the
beneÞts of economic activity. As the tax competition does not aect the location of
23See, e.g. Barros and Cabral (2000), Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006), Ma (2013) and Ma (2017). Though
Haußer and Wooton (1999) do not discuss the welfare eects of FDI competition, their analysis also
implies this result.
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the FDI, the losing country is unaected in equilibrium. Tax competition results in
a redistribution of rents between the Þrm and the winning country. We have already
established the thresholds that determine which country wins and whether it does so
with a tax or a subsidy. If the Þrm making the investment has its ownership in the rest
of the world (that is, in neither country D nor country E), then an equilibrium tax
will increase regional welfare while a subsidy will reduce it.
As we noted in the above analysis, all else equal, the larger the market size of country E
relative to that of country D gives an edge to country E, while close similarity in
the varieties (a low degree of product dierentiation) can put country D in a more
advantageous position in attracting the MNEs new investment. The larger a countrys
geographic advantage, the greater its ability to tax the FDI in equilibrium. If the
winning countrys edge its rival is insu!ciently large, then it needs to subsidize the
FDI in equilibrium. However, if the winning countrys advantage is great enough, then
it is can tax the Þrm while capturing the FDI.24
Figure 2 adds the two additional thresholds, eWW and eWWW, to the previous diagram in
order to illustrate the tax/subsidy implications of policy competition. The original eW
curve is unchanged, since we have established that policy competition does not aect
the MNEs location choice, but merely aects the after-tax earnings of the Þrm and
the rents accrued by the host nation.
The curve marked eWW corresponds to expression (14). When parameter conÞgurations
are above the curve, country D taxes the MNE, and competition for FDI Pareto-weakly
improves national welfare of the competing countries. When parameter conÞgurations
are between the eW and eWW curves, country D subsidizes FDI, and competition for FDI
Pareto-weakly reduces national welfare of the competing countries. The curve marked
eWWW is the threshold given by expression (16). When parameter conÞgurations are below
this curve, country E taxes the MNE and FDI competition Pareto-weakly enhances
national welfare of the competing countries. When parameter conÞgurations are be-
tween the eW and eWWW curves, country E subsidizes the MNE and the FDI competition
24That subsidy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing
countries seems to be interesting, and this result is in line with Ma (2013). Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)
obtain a similar result. That happens when one of the competing countries does not beneÞt from the
entry of the MNE; and hence, its valuation of FDI is strictly negative. This increases the bargaining
power of the other country and may lead to taxation of FDI rather than subsidies. In contrast, we
derive the result in the situation where both countries have an economic incentive to attract FDI.
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Figure 2: Corporate taxes or subsidies on FDI in equlibrium
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Pareto weakly reduces national welfare of the competing countries. Therefore, when
parameter conÞgurations are close to the eW curve, meaning that no country has an
overwhelming geographic advantage, the winning country needs to pay a subsidy to
the MNE in order to oset the subsidy oer made by its rival. When the winning
country has a su!ciently strong geographic advantage relative to its rival, reßected in
parameter conÞgurations far from the eW curve, then the winning country can attract
the FDI while taxing the MNE.
The dashed horizontal line reveals the full range of possible outcomes as Q increases
while e remains constant, starting from the initial intersection with the vertical axis
where Q = 1. When the two countries are the same size, the FDI will take place in
country D. This is because the Þrm will wish to separate spatially its two plants that
are producing horizontally dierentiated goods. When the two goods are su!ciently
similar, the host country is able to tax the Þrm. As the size of country E relative to that
of country D starts to increase, country D becomes a less attractive destination and
will have to subsidize the Þrm in order to capture the FDI. Eventually as Q increases,
country Ds subsidy will be insu!cient to win the FDI and country Es subsidy will,
instead, attract the new investment. With a su!ciently large asymmetry in country
size, the second variety will, in equilibrium, be produced in country E despite the fact
that the Þrm is taxed for locating there.
In a similar fashion, we can analyse the outcomes for a given size dierential between the
two countries but for dierent degrees of substitutability between the two varieties. This
is shown as the vertical, dotted line in Figure 2. When the two goods are completely
distinct (e = 0), the production of both will be located in the larger country. If Q
is su!ciently large, country E taxes the FDI in equilibrium. As e rises, country D
becomes a more attractive location for production of the second variety, such that the
tax/subsidy and location outcomes change along the length of the dotted line.
6 Summary and conclusions
We have looked at the choice of an MNE as to the location of its new production facility
in a region, in which it produces a horizontally dierentiated variety of the product
that it is already manufacturing in the region. We have further considered how this
decision is aected by the introduction of investment incentives by the governments
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of the potential nations. The Þnal stage of our analysis concerns the implications for
domestic welfare and the Þrms after-tax proÞts of this international competition to
attract the FDI.
Our results show, in particular, that the Þrms location choice is determined exclusively
by the interaction between the market-size eect and the product-dierentiation eect,
both of which (as deÞned) work to attract the FDI to the larger market. Given the
existence of intra-regional trade costs, the Þrm seeks to establish its new production fa-
cility in the location that minimizes these expenses across both varieties of its product.
Thus one or both of these eects has to be weak if the smaller country is to have the
opportunity of attracting the FDI. If, for example, the product-dierentiation eect is
very weak and the varieties are therefore close substitutes for one another, then the
Þrm will have an incentive to spatially separate its two plants. If, instead, the varieties
are strongly dierentiated from each other, the Þrm will locate the production of both
varieties in the country that provides the larger domestic market.
When we consider the role of Þscal competition in inßuencing the location decision
of the Þrm we Þnd that it is entirely impotent. Thus while the import-substitution
eect creates an incentive for the rival governments to make bids in order to attract
the FDI, in equilibrium it has no eect on the choice of location. Furthermore, the
location decision made independently by the MNE is e!cient, such that the policy
competition merely results in transfers between the host(s) of the FDI and the MNE.
With respect to the distribution eects from the FDI, the competition for FDI may
Pareto weakly improve the national welfare of the competing countries when the host
nations geographic advantage is su!ciently strong that it is able to tax the MNE in
equilibrium.
Though the existing literature has addressed the interplay between market-size and
import-substitution eects, as far as we know the product-dierentiation eect that
we have introduced is new to studies of tax competition with imperfectly competitive
markets.
Going beyond our analysis, it would be interesting to investigate policy competition
in the situation when the MNEs existing and new varieties are complements rather
than substitutes. A more challenging task would be to combine the basic idea of this
paper and that of Ferrett and Wooton (2010b) to study tax competition for at least
two heterogeneous Þrms in the context of imperfect competition. We hope to report
22
results of these studies in near future.
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7 Appendix
We discuss here the quasi-linear utility function from which inverse demand systems
are derived and we show how we calculate countries consumer surplus when the MNE
introduces the new variety into the region. In fact, we implicitly assume that the
representative agent in each country l has a quasi-linear preference in the form of:
X l = t
l
1
 1
2
tl2
1
+p> (only good 1 available)
(tl
1
+ tl
2
) 1
2
(tl2
1
+ 2etl
1
tl
2
+ tl2
2
) +p> (both goods 1 and 2 available)
where p is a homogenous numéraire good; 0  e  1.
It is easy to check that the inverse demand systems when the MNE produces and
sells both varieties in the region (expression (1)) are derived from maximizing X l =
(tl
1
+ tl
2
) 1
2
(tl2
1
+ 2etl
1
tl
2
+ tl2
2
) +p subject to the budget constraint. Each countrys
representative agent receives consumer surplus equal to:
fvl =
¡
tl
1
+ tl
2
¢
 1
2
¡
tl2
1
+ 2etl
1
tl
2
+ tl2
2
¢
 sl
1
tl
1
 sl
2
tl
2
=
The smaller country D has a single consumer, while the larger country E has Q
consumers. Consequently, country Es total consumption surplus is equal to Q times
its representative agents consumer surplus.
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